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I.

Introduction
The case of The Arrogante Barcelones involved a complicated story of facts, due in part

to the cunningness of one of the main players, Joseph Almeida. 1 Unraveling the circumstances 2
of how the case came to the United States Supreme Court has more to do with the antics of
Joseph Almeida, than other typical captures at sea. However, Almeida’s maneuvers are easier to
follow with an understanding of nineteenth century Baltimore, the War of 1812, and U.S.
citizens’ involvement in South American privateering. 3 At first glance, this case appeared to
focus on issues that were raised regarding the validity of Almeida’s commission, the authority of
the condemnation, and the sufficiency of the documentation produced to prove it. 4 However, the
United States Supreme Court ultimately avoids untangling those maritime issues and instead
bases its opinion in a more unusual category of law, 5 opening up issues still relevant to that
subject today. 6
II.

Background
To understand the setting that leads to the United States Supreme Court case, The

Arrogante Barcelones, 7 it is necessary to explore the growth of Baltimore and its merchants, 8 the
role in the War of 1812, 9 and its privateersmen in international maritime presence 10.
A. Baltimore’s Ascension to an American Trading Power
Having more than doubled in population and increased exports over sevenfold between
the first federal census in 1790 and the second in 1800, Baltimore became the third commercial
1
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port of the Union. 11 Baltimore became a chartered city on December 31, 1796. 12 This new
charter allowed the municipal authority to enact ordinances that helped to effectuate progress,
preservation, and deepening in the inner harbor. 13 Among all the necessities of expansion facing
the blooming city, the chief objective on citizen’s minds was the harbor. 14 While the entire city
developed, the “small circumscribed area of sixty acres was to prove the nucleus of the future
great port, the maritime City of Baltimore.” 15 Thus, at the turn of the century, Baltimore was the
youngest of the chief commercial cities on the eastern seaboard. 16
Merchants were not only interested in the import and export business flourishing in the
Baltimore Harbor, but also investing in shipbuilding. Merchants were interested both in
investing in the endeavor, and also in financing their own ships. Baltimore merchants accounted
for approximately fifty-six percent of the investments in ships, where non-merchants only made
up for twenty-six percent. 17 One of the factors that contributed very heavily to Baltimore’s
reputation in the maritime industry was the superior construction and sailing abilities of its
schooners, which became known as the world famous “Baltimore clippers.” 18 The Baltimore
clipper first appeared in the Revolutionary War. By 1800 the Baltimore clipper was extremely
popular with privateersmen, slavers, smugglers, and almost anyone who wished to conduct
business privately. 19 It is on brink of Baltimore booming into the maritime industry that Joseph

11

CLAYTON COLMAN HALL, BALTIMORE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE 63 (1912).
Id.
13
Id. at 64.
14
Id. This was a time when tobacco was the principal export into the United States. Id.
15
Id. at 66.
16
Id. at 63.
17
Geoffrey Gilbert, THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, Maritime Enterprise in the New Republic: Investment in
Baltimore Shipping, 1789-1793 18 (1984).
18
JOHN PHILIPS CRANWELL & WILLIAM BOWERS CRANE, MEN OF MARQUE: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE ARMED
VESSELS OUT OF BALTIMORE DURING THE WAR OF 1812, 37 (W. W. NORTON & CO. INC. 1940).
19
Id. "The chief characteristics of these craft were long, light, and extremely raking masts; very little rigging; low
freeboard; great rake to stem and stern posts, with a great deal of drag to the keel. . . . Their deadrise was great and
bilges slack. The beam was usually great for their length. Nearly always flush-decked, they had wide, clear decks,
12

4

Almeida arrived in Baltimore and quickly built a reputation as a skilled seaman. 20
B. Baltimore Merchants’ Role in the War of 1812
While the Embargo Act of April 4, 1812 had cut back on trade, the declaration of the War
of 1812 brought a new daring enterprise to Baltimore: privateering. 21 The purpose of the
embargo act was twofold. 22 First, it shielded American ships from enemy capture once war was
declared. 23 Secondly, it prevented food from being shipped to British troops on the Iberian
Peninsula. 24 However, the farsighted Baltimore businessmen better understood what the
embargo meant to business, and anticipated commissions from President Madison. 25 Some
Baltimore businessmen had even begun converting their fastest vessels from merchantmen to
commerce raiders. 26
“That act of Congress turned Baltimore from a peaceful trading center into a hive of
privateering activity which ceased only with the end of the war.” 27 More privateers were
commissioned out of Baltimore than any other port in the United States, and Baltimore was
known for producing privateers instrumental to the cause. 28 By August 18, 1812, there were
fifty-six privateers at sea from the United States and of those thirteen were from Baltimore. 29
Baltimore privateers were more numerous than those from any other port and usually surpassed
others in the havoc they wrecked on enemy commerce. 30 “The city’s location made it an
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important port; Baltimore vessels were numerous and well manned; her merchants were used to
taking chances…; and the spirit of the men who made their living either directly or indirectly
from the sea was very much in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war.” 31 Another one of the
factors that largely contributed to Baltimore’s impact on the War of 1812 was the superior
construction, sailing quality, speed, and maneuverability of the “Baltimore clippers.” 32
Privateers were essentially licensed predators, which were equipped precisely for
commerce raiding. 33 While privateers lacked considerable cargo-carrying capability, they were
heavily armed and manned for combat situations. 34 Even more unique was that the crew did not
earn a salary, but instead were often compensated solely from the prize proceeds. 35 In order to
be a sanctioned privateer, one needed a commission or a letter of marque. 36 In the United States,
the U.S. Constitution vested the power to commission privateers in the Congress. 37 Congress in
turn delegated that power to officials of the State Department. 38 Commissions would generally
include the essential privateer information including the rig, tonnage, names of the vessel,
owners, captain, number of guns, and size of the crew. 39 Commissions were additionally
accompanied by instructions to privateers, or written orders by the United States government. 40
The instructions were meant to confine the conduct of privateers to those acceptable under the
law of nations, but also shield the United States from any embarrassing claims by neutral
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countries. 41 If a privateer was violated of the instructions or neutrality laws, they could stand to
lose their prize, bonds, commissions, and possibly even have to pay damages. 42
While it was ultimately the captor’s master who selected the port and prize court once a
belligerent ship was captured, she was usually brought to the nearest port. 43 Generally, the
captor had some discretion in determining the prize court, 44 but the law of nations required the
captor to consider the convenience to the captured vessel’s owners or cargo shippers. 45 A blatant
neglect for the convenience of claimant could result in a loss of the prize in court and assessment
of damages against the captors. 46 Similarly, an unlawful capture of a ship (either by a privateer
with false papers or of a neutral) could lead to negative results in court. 47
The law of nations designed the maritime judicial process to allow seafarers to play their
part and depart early on from court proceedings. 48 When possible, courts used exclusively the
ships documents and both crews’ testimonies to promptly determine whether there was a lawful
prize. 49 To be efficient, crewmembers’ testimony was taken by standing interrogatories—the
approved forms of judicial questionnaires. 50 These testimonies were taken before the
commissioners of the court in isolated areas to quickly and privately streamline the process. 51 If
the ship was deemed a lawful and good prize based on the documents provided, the ship and the
cargo were condemned and sold, leaving the court to hold the proceeds. 52 The court first
distributed the proceeds to valid neutral claim. If the prize was captured by a navy warship, the
41
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remaining proceeds were distributed amongst the captor’s sovereign. However, if the captor was
a civilian privateer, the sovereign waived its share and the proceeds were distributed amongst
only the captor’s crew. 53
Baltimore became a standout during the War of 1812, but so did Almeida. During the
War of 1812 Almeida was captain of the schooner Caroline, and subsequently of the schooner
Kemp. 54 While captain of those vessels, Almeida captured no fewer than thirty-five British ships
and made almost $300,ooo in net prize proceeds. 55 Almeida’s skill as a sailor and strategist not
only increased his value to his financier-partners, but also made him a war hero. 56 For example,
on the morning of December 1, 1814, the Kemp’s lookout spotted a convoy of nine British
vessels. 57 Though a massive British frigate guarded the fleet, Almeida, in perhaps the brashest
move by a Baltimore privateersman, singlehandedly took on the convoy. 58 The engagement
began in the early afternoon and continued well into the next morning. 59 In the end, Almeida
had skillfully out sailed and outfought seven of the vessels, and captured five. 60 Naval historians
have ranked that triumph as one of the great privateer achievements of the War of 1812. 61
When hostilities with Britain ended, Almeida was forced to trade the thrill of privateering
for the humdrum of merchant shipping. 62 While running cargo in the Friends Hope, Almeida
learned that the Spanish had gained control of what is today Carthagena, Columbia. 63 Almeida’s
merchant experience during the Embargo Act of 1807 had taught him that contraband was the
53
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most lucrative cargo. 64 Knowing that trade with Carthagena would be banned, Almeida
redirected his course to Columbia. 65 Unfortunately, the Spanish were more deceptive than
Almeida anticipated, and the Spanish captured the Friends Hope along with her captain and
crew. 66 After excessively brutal treatment by the Spanish, they eventually released Almeida, but
kept the Friends Hope. 67
C. Baltimore Privateers Assisting in the South American Revolutions
After the end of the War of 1812 American vessels were offered no opportunities for
United States government sanctioned prize taking. 68 Even though the United States did not
engage in war involving attacks on maritime commerce, 69 Americans were not deterred from
prize taking and privateering. 70 Instead, American privateers found a new cause to support. 71
Some of the unemployed Baltimore vessels harnessed their energies to support the cause of the
Spanish-American revolutions. 72 Unfortunately outfitting vessels and accepting commissions
from revolutionary South American Governments at war with Spain directly conflicted with the
United States policy of neutrality. 73 “Serving the South American republics in this manner was
illegal, as U.S. law prohibited any American from owning, commanding, or sailing aboard a
foreign privateer that intended to attack a nation at peace with the United States.” 74 Ultimately,
the potential profits from South American privateering ventures were too enticing and
substantially outweighed the legal ramifications that faced each shareholder standing to gain a
64
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fortune. 75
Although the South American privateering clearly violated the United States’ neutrality
laws, Baltimore privateers were not deterred. In fact, Baltimore became the epicenter for
privateering in the service of new republics. 76 In 1816 a syndicate of very silent partnerships
formed in the counting houses of Baltimore to back a fleet of “patriot privateers.” 77 Many
“respectable” Baltimore merchants publically disapproved of this activity, but a number did
privately participate in “the American Concern.” 78 For example, “politically active Baltimoreans
such as General William Winder, attorney William Pinkney, collector of the port James
McCulloch, and postmaster John Skinner were involved in the legal defense of the concern.” 79
According to then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the business of patriot privateering not
only “spread over a large portion of the merchants” in Baltimore, but had also “infected almost
every officer of the United States in the place.” 80
“According to Adams, the district attorney, Elias Glenn, in addition to being ‘a weak,
incompetent man,’ had ‘a son concerned in the privateers’; the postmaster, John Skinner,
had been ‘indicted for being concerned in the piratical privateers’; the customs collector,
James McCulloh, was ‘an enthusiast for the South Americans, and easily duped by
knaves’; the ‘Inspectors of the Revenue were in the habit of receiving presents from the
importing merchants’; and somehow, privateers were never caught smuggling their prize
goods into Baltimore.” 81
The entrance of several other revolutionary governments into privateering increased the activity
in South American privateering. 82 In Baltimore, the more prominent revolutionary government
was the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, which became known as Buenos Aires, and later
75
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Argentina. 83
Such was the situation in early 1816 when Thomas Taylor 84 appeared in Baltimore. 85 He
brought with him six privateering licenses signed in blank for the purposes of organizing a
campaign against Spanish seaborne commerce, on behalf of the rebellious Buenos Aires
government that was incapable of combating the Spanish at sea. 86 In return for their service,
privateer captains would receive a substantial share of the prize proceeds. 87 Taylor painted an
alluring picture of the possibilities awaiting those who took advantage of his offer. 88 He arrived
to Baltimore about the same time Almeida arrived back from his imprisonment in Carthagena
angry and distraught. 89 Providentially, Taylor quickly approached Almeida with his business
proposition to assist Buenos Aires in its struggle for liberation by preying on Spanish ships. 90
In all his time imprisoned by the Spanish, Almeida could not have dreamed of a better
offer. This South American privateering opportunity meant that he would “replenish his estate,
avenge the indignities he had suffered in Carthagena, avoid the tedium of the merchant trade, and
serve the cause of liberty—most likely in that order.” 91 Of the many Baltimoreans who
undertook privateering for the South American rebel governments, Almeida was most clear as to

83

Id.
Thomas Taylor was born in Bermuda, but had immigrated to the United States and had become a citizen resident
of Wilmington, Delaware. Eventually in 1810 Taylor took up residence in Buenos Aires and sailed for some time a
privateer on its behalf. Eventually, Taylor established his connection with Baltimore, Maryland in 1816 when he
arrived with six letters of marque and reprisal against Spanish seaborne commerce. Fred Hopkins, For Freedom and
Profit: Baltimore Privateers in the Wars of South American Independence, XVIII Nos. 3-4 THE NORTHERN
MARINER 93, 94 (July–Oct. 2008).
85
Id. at 3.
86
Id.
87
Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 316.
88
Giffin, supra note 82, at 3.
89
Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 315.
90
Id. at 316.
91
Id.
84

11

his motive: revenge. 92 The excessive cruelty Almeida experienced from the Spanish had
embittered him. 93 “Cartagena [is] ever memorable to me by the cruelties which I received from
[Spanish General] Morillo and his army,” stated Almeida. 94 He explained that his resentment for
his loss of the Friends Hope and his personal injuries were what carried him into the South
American service. 95 So, Almeida took Taylor up on his offer. 96 Taylor provided the
commission, 97 and Almeida became a citizen of the Buenos Aires—a country the United States
government had not yet recognized. 98 With his vendetta against the Spanish arranged, Almeida
set off in his first of many cruises against the Spanish. 99
“After just his first two cruises, 100 “Almeida had successfully interrupted supply lines
between Spain and its colonies, intercepted royal communications, and looted Spanish vessels
and cargos worth several million dollars.” 101 But Almeida may have been too successful,
“because the injury and humiliation he heaped upon the Spanish crown was ultimately his
undoing.” 102 After being acquitted for violating neutrality laws, 103 Almeida again set sail for his
third cruise on behalf of Buenos Aires in the summer of 1817. 104 His destination was the area
between the Azores and the Canary Islands, where several trading routes converged. 105 While
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captain of the Congreso, Almeida boarded at least 165 vessels. 106 A majority of the vessels were
neutral, and so Almeida let them go. 107 But the twenty-four Spanish vessels Almeida excitedly
and excessively pillaged. 108 The most valuable ships were delivered to Buenos Aires and the rest
were plundered and torched at sea. 109
III.

The Voyage and the Capture
After a rigorous summer cruise, Almeida determined that the Congreso’s best days were

behind her. 110 Instead of enlisting his Baltimore financiers to refit the Congreso, Almeida
decided to use his prize proceeds and strike out on his own. 111 He purchased one of his best
trophies captured by the Congreso, the frigate Diana, and rechristened her the Louisa. 112
Almeida then had the Louisa commissioned as a Buenos Airean privateer and set out for Fells
Point in Baltimore, Maryland. 113 Since Baltimore was a hotspot for “patriot privateers,” it was
the best place for Almeida to have the Louisa refitted for privateering and to recruit an adequate
amount of seasoned crewmen. 114 In order to avoid arrest or seizure, with the U.S. legal system
cracking down on Almeida, the Louisa posed as a merchant ship temporarily commissioned
under Ezra Drew, one of Almeida’s officers. 115 In fact, Almeida hid in the cargo hold when the
Louisa drifted quietly into Baltimore harbor in April 1818. 116 Almeida entered Baltimore
without detection, deposited his prize money, visited his family, and slyly equipped the Louisa as
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a privateer. 117
On August 1, 1818 after four months of work, the Louisa appeared in the shadow of Fort
McHenry. 118 Upon her initial departure, only ten guns and some small arms, and a ninety-six
men crew made up of mostly United States citizens, armed the Louisa. 119 However, the
transformation of the Louisa was not complete.

120

About four days out from Baltimore, the

Louisa anchored at the entrance of the Patuxent River to rendezvous with a pilot boat. 121 That
pilot boat delivered: six eighteen-pound gunnades, twenty-six muskets, eighteen pistols,
seventeen cutlasses, thirty kegs of powder, eighty round shot, fifty star shot, and two kegs of
musket balls. 122 The Louisa was now ready for her maiden cruise as a privateer.
When the Louisa originally left Baltimore approximately half of the seaman onboard had
signed articles for a sealing voyage to the Northwest coast of America for $16 a month. 123 After
the Louisa was about fifteen days out to sea, Almeida announced the true mission of the vessel
and demanded that the entire crew sign new privateering articles. 124 Many of the crew refused to
sign the privateering articles, but not due to complete outrage of Almeida’s deception or fear of
legal troubles back in the United States for violating neutrality laws. 125 Besides, the crew had to
have known the true mission when four days into the voyage the Louisa received such excessive
armory. 126 Even the Niles Weekly Register considered Almeida’s cover ridiculously apparent.
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When they reported, upon Almeida’s request, that the ship Louisa was “bound round Cape Horn,
on a sealing voyage!” they jokingly added that with “16 heavy guns and 101 men,” Almeida
would “no doubt do great execution on the coasts of Peru!” 127 It is speculated that the true
reason many of the crew refused to sign the privateering articles is because they felt their
negotiating power was so strong at sea that they could stand to gain a greater share of the
profits. 128 However Almeida dispelled the dissenters with grand threats of violence and
abandonment to those who refused to sign. 129 Almeida ordered the few remaining crewmembers
who refused to sign the new privateering documents be put in irons—two were even put on
board another vessel. 130
With the captain and crew now on the same page, 131 Almeida continued the Louisa on
her intended voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. 132 They proceeded to cruise off Lisbon about
nine leagues from Corunna on the northwest coast of Spain. 133 On September 9, 1818 Almeida
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spotted a brig showing British colors. 134 He ordered that his own British flag be raised while the
Louisa stalked the vessel. 135 Once the vessel was within gunshot, Almeida raised the Louisa’s
actual Buenos Airean flag and ordered a series of shots from his bowchasers to make the chase
heave to. 136 Almost simultaneously the other brig replaced her British flag with the Royal
Spanish flag, but quickly hauled it down after realizing her pursuer. 137 Captain Almeida boarded
the brig and instantly realized his extraordinary prize. 138
The brig Arrogante Barcelones was a magnificent one hundred forty and a half ton
vessel, 139 having proved to be a fast sailor during the Louisa’s pursuit. 140 But even more
impressive was her cargo. 141 The brig had just returned from Caracas with cargo full of coffee,
indigo, rum, cotton, copper, $50,000 in cocoa and a quantity of specie rumored to be between
$150,000 and $200,000. 142 Such a brilliant prize Almeida simply could not pass up. 143 Instead
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of sending a prize master and crew aboard the Arrogante Barcelones like usual, he personally
sailed the brig to the prize court on the Venezuelan island of Margarita 144 that was authorized to
adjudicated prizes for Buenos Aires, and delegated the command of the Louisa to his first
lieutenant Smith. 145
IV.

The Legal Battle
In the fall of 1818, Almeida arrived at the port of Juan Griego, in the Venezuelan island

of Margarita where proceedings were initiated for organizing for condemnation of the Arrogante
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Barcelones and her cargo. 146 On October 12, 1818 the Court of Admiralty condemned the ship
and cargo as Spanish property and a lawful prize of war. 147 However, those court documents
were “uncommonly bald.” 148 After the condemnation Almeida purchased the brig at public
auction. 149 He planned to mimic the path of the Louisa, and take the newly commissioned
Arrogante Barcelones to be refitted in Baltimore where Almeida would again enter the port
posing as a merchant. 150 But word of the Arrogante Barcelones capture had already reached the
Spanish consul in Baltimore, Don Juan Bautista Bernabeu. 151 This time, Almeida’s disguise did
not fool Bernabeu, who took immediate legal action when Almeida returned to Baltimore. 152
Almost immediately upon return to Baltimore, a libel was hurdled at Almeida. 153 The
libel—initiated by Berabeu—was filed by attorney John Purviance 154 on behalf of the Arrogante
Barcelones’ rightful owners. 155 In order to avoid the same issues that thwarted District Attorney
Elias Glenn in previous cases against Almeida, Purviance prolonged the proceedings in order to
obtain his own evidence in the form of depositions to combat Almeida’s abundance of receipts,
commissions, condemnation, and other documents manufactured in South America. 156 Judge
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James Houston’s untimely illness further delayed the proceedings, which gave Purviance more
time to gather witness depositions.157
When Judge Houston did not recover for an extended amount of time, President Monroe
appointed Baltimore County Judge Theodorick Bland 158 to take his place on the federal bench. 159
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was not pleased with Judge Houston’s replacement. 160
Several reports had indicated that Judge Bland invested in patriot privateering with Postmaster
Skinner, his brother-in-law. 161 While Judge Bland proved to be innocent of the more serious
allegations, Adams still opposed his elevation to the federal bench in 1819 because “‘it was
impossible that he should be impartial’ with regard to ‘the most important cases pending before
the Court’.” 162
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Since Judge Bland’s intimate and extremely controversial ties to Baltimore’s patriot
privateering almost defeated his appointment, he eagerly showed his judicial independence from
the cause. 163 Almeida’s case was Judge Bland’s perfect opportunity. First, Almeida had no
major merchants or financial intersests backing his most recent enterprise in privateering on the
Louisa or purchasing the Arrogante Barcelones. 164 Secondly, even though Almeida produced a
copy of the sentence from the Prize Court at Juan Griego that was certified by the Notary or
Secretary of Marine, and whose signature was verified by the certificate of the deputy of the
Republic of Colombia to the United States, the United States government had not yet received
the Republic of Colombia in that capacity. 165 Not only could Judge Bland avoid upsetting the
upper-crust of Baltimore, but the facts of this case seemed on his side. Thus, decrees of
restitution of the Arrogante Barcelones to her rightful Spanish owners were entered, pro forma,
in the District and Circuit Courts. 166
V.

Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
The lower courts’ decisions in favor of the Arrogante Barcelones’ rightful Spanish

owners left Almeida unsatisfied. He initiated a final appeal to the United States Supreme Court
hoping for a contrary outcome.
A. Almeida’s Arguments
William Winder, 167 a Brigadier General in the War of 1812 and a prominent attorney in
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Baltimore, represented Almeida as his primary attorney on the record. 168 In fact, Winder
represented Almeida in a number of other cases throughout his career. Winder first argued that a
settled rule of the United States Supreme Court was not to interfere with these types of cases. 169
Specifically he asserted that the evidence in this case was too debatable to justify the Court in
denying the captor, Almeida, of the possession, the brig Arrogante Barcelones, which he
acquired at war. 170 Secondly Winder asserted that even if he was mistaken in his first argument,
the capture of the Arrogante Barcelones did not violate the United States neutrality laws. 171 He
stated that the neutrality laws were not violated because the capture was made by the Louisa, a
lawfully commissioned privateer of Buenos Aires whose title had been confirmed by a regular
condemnation in the Prize Court of Venezuela, an ally of Buenos Aires in the war against
Spain. 172 Winder asserted as a universal proposition “that a sentence of condemnation by a
competent Court is conclusive, as to the proprietary interest in the res capta, and upon the mere
question of prize or no prize.” 173 Furthermore, he argued that the United States Supreme Court
was a neutral tribunal in the matter and therefore it was precluded “from all inquiry into the
precious circumstances under which the capture was made, and whether the capturing vessel had
been armed and equipped in violation of [United States’] neutrality.” 174 Winder cautioned the
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Court that there must be some limitations on inquiries into the usual sentence of condemnation
that quiets the title acquired in war, as designated by the law of nations. 175 He concluded that a
decree of restitution in this case would “so far affect the general doctrine of conclusiveness as to
disturb the safety of neutral purchasers.” 176
B. The Consul General of Spain’s Arguments
Although Bernabeu had originally hired attorney John Purviance to file the libel against
the Arrogante Barcelones and her cargo on behalf of her rightful Spanish owners, he was not the
primary attorney on the record at the United States Supreme Court. 177 Arguments on behalf of
the brig’s rightful Spanish owners were almost entirely entered by attorney David Hoffman. 178
Hoffman presented extensive arguments compared to Almeida’s attorney, Winder. 179
First, Hoffman argued that there was not sufficient evidence of an existing condemnation
substantiated in this case. 180 All the court has been provided is the minimal and miniscule
sentence by the Court of San Griego stating that the property is Spanish and condemning it as a
legal prize. 181 Furthermore the Court has not been provided with the libel, nor an abstract of
proof. 182 Even more complicating was that the condemnation did not provide the critical
evidence required, like the character of the capturing vessel, who commanded the capturing
vessel, who commissioned the capturing vessel, who owned or equipped the capturing vessel, the
authority of the Court of San Griego to adjudicate that claims, or the connection (if any) between
Venezuela and Buenos Aires. 183 Hoffman asserted that in similarly situated cases, the Court
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should adhere to its former rule and require the entire prize proceedings to be produced as
evidence. 184 He posited that if the Court chose not to require the entire prize proceedings, it
should at a minimum require both the sentence and the libel—the libel proving essential. 185 He
argued that this case, more so than any other imagined, required showing the grounds and extent
of the proceeding because “it does not appear that Almeida had any commission; and if this be
the fact, no condemnation would avail, were it ever so well authenticated.” 186
Second, Hoffman stated that if the condemnation was adequately proved, he contended
that the sentence was asserted by a court incompetent to adjudicate the case; that the entire
proceeding was coram non judice 187; and that the obligation to inquire into the jurisdiction of
another court whose judgments or decrees it is to rely on belonged to all courts. 188 Hoffman
stated that under the law of nations an operative sentence of condemnation must come from
either the court of the captor sitting in the country of the captor, or the court of the captor held in
the country of an ally or co-belligerent. 189 He posited that courts of the ally or co-belligerent
were not competent to hold plea of captures made by anyone other than itself. 190 He explained
that condemnations in the port of an ally or co-belligerent were frequent, but there had never
been a case of a condemnation in the court of an ally. 191 Hoffman stressed that the “very silence
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of the writer on the law of admiralty as to this subject, and the absence of all judicial authority,
argues the soundness of the doctrine contended for.” 192
Additionally, Hoffman presented a compelling policy argument regarding the worldwide
importance of judicial inquiry into the regularity of prize proceedings. 193 He explained that the
capturing nation had an interest in knowing that its own prize rules were adhered too, and its own
courts were best equip to ensure that the rules are complied with since they were the most
competent on the subject. 194 The country of the captured belligerent has an interest in the
property taken in order to compel a party in the wrong to pay retribution, for the principals in the
war to settle accounts, and in that it is mutually responsible for the justice and regularity of all
hostile acts. 195 Lastly, neutral nations were concerned that the courts of that capturing
belligerent refuse to inquire into the regularity and validity of seizures made from them. 196
Hoffman reasoned “there appears to be a moral fitness in the rule which would restrict the power
of condemnation to the tribunals of that belligerent by whom the property was actually taken.” 197
In addition to his objections as to the validity and mode of authenticating the
condemnation, and the competency of the tribunal pronouncing the condemnation, Hoffman
asserted that the Court should be provided with proof of “an alliance or association in arms
between Venezuela, the alleged ally, and the power, whatever that may be, under which
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[Almeida] pretends to have acted.” 198 Hoffman stated that the Court had no evidence that the
condemnation was even pronounced by the court of an ally, because there had been no
commission produced and the barren condemnation did not acknowledge the power granting any
commission to Almeida. 199 The necessity of proving the alliance was another added reason for
demanding the production of something more than the bare sentence of condemnation. 200
Hoffman also contended that if all of his previous objections were deemed unfounded, he
maintained that a condemnation by a court of competent jurisdiction did not divest the United
States Supreme Court of its power to restore the property to the rightful owners. 201 He asserted
that the exercise of that power is essential to the maintenance of the United States’ own laws and
neutrality. 202 He reminded the Court that it is within its ability to undo that which has been done
in breach of U.S. laws, but only so far as to place both parties into their positions prior to the
illegal act. 203 Hoffman explained that the only inquiry needed by the Court was whether or not
Almeida acquired the possession of the Arrogante Barcelones by means unlawful to the United
States. 204 If the Court determined that Almeida fraudulently acquired possession of the brig, it
was the Court’s duty to restore it to the rightful Spanish owners from whom it has been seized by
the illegal instrumentality of our citizens.
Hoffman’s final, and briefest argument was that Almeida was not a neutral purchaser
because captured the brig Arrogante Barcelones for his own benefit. 205 He asserted that
Almeida’s eventual possession of the brig was gained from his own wrong and therefore he
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could not, by his own acts, give himself a better title to the brig 206. Essentially, the
“condemnation could only corroborate the title which [Almeida] had gained, and could not
clothe him with a better one.” 207
C. Almeida’s Rebuttal Argument
After such expansive arguments by Hoffman, Winder opted to rebut. He denied the rule
asserted by Hoffman that it was necessary for the libel to accompany the sentence of
condemnation, since the sentence showed what the libel would show. 208 Furthermore, he
asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court had never inquired further into proceedings and instead had
always admitted the conclusiveness of the sentence of condemnation, even as to the collateral
effects. 209
As for the competency of the Court of Juan Griego, Winder asserted that the connection
between all of the revolutionary Spanish provinces was notorious, that even the President had
acknowledged the present state of common contest of the provinces again Spain, and that courts
generally took those facts into consideration. 210 He asserted that Venezuela was known to be at
war with Spain, and that the brig Arrogante Barcelones was the property of Spain, her enemy,
brought into her country. 211 He negated Hoffman’s assertion, and stated that there was no
positive authority denying the authority of courts of a co-belligerent from condemning prizes
captured by its co-belligerent, and thus it was sufficient that “no reason of principle or public
policy exists to prevent it.” 212
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D. Justice Johnson’s Decision
Oddly enough, as the Supreme Court at time surprises, the decision in this case was not
founded in either side’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of either the condemnation of the
documentation evidence provided. 213 Instead, the Supreme Court found Hoffman’s final
argument persuasive—ultimately basing the majority opinion on it. 214 After reviewing all the
evidence and arguments, Justice Johnson explained the Court’s conclusion of the facts.
“[Almeida] not only violated the neutrality of [the United States] government, but effected his
purpose by practising a flagrant fraud, either upon his crew, or upon the revenue officers of the
port of Baltimore; or perhaps upon both.” 215 Justice Johnson continued by stating that every
aspect of the case proved that the sealing voyage around Cape Horn was a mere ruse. 216 The
unquestionable truth was that the crew completely understood the privateering venture from the
start. 217 Their only misled belief was that their artificial ignorance, or the audacity of the
scheme, would shield them from punishment for entering into belligerent service. 218 Although
the actions of the were not at issue, 219 the explanation by Justice Johnson expresses the
fraudulent nature of the entire enterprise in this case, and more generally in Baltimore’s patriot
privateers.
Without all the linguistics, there were only a few arguments made by either party.
Winder argued that (1) the neutrality laws were not violated because the Louisa was a foreign
vessel, commissioned, owned, and outfitted in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, a
sovereign nation at war with Spain; and (2) that Almeida was the bona fide purchaser of the
213
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Arrogante Barcelones. 220 In response, Hoffman argued that in fact, the Louisa was owned and
outfitted in the United States as a privateer to cruise against Spain in violation of the United
States’ neutrality laws. 221 Despite the detailed arguments regarding the sufficiency of the
condemnation and the documentation provided at trial, the United States Supreme Court opinion
avoids acknowledging or basing its opinion on those grounds. 222 Justice Johnson acknowledged
that while there was no question that Almeida was a flagrant offender against the neutrality laws
of the United States, the only roadblock in applying the established rule of the Court in cases of
illegal outfitting was the condemnation of the vessel and cargo in the Court of Margaritta. 223
Thus, Justice Johnson circumvented the issue in his opinion by waiving all expression of its
opinion on the questions raised upon the validity of the condemnation or the sufficiency of the
documentation produced to prove it. 224
Instead, the United States Supreme Court rested its opinion on a “single, and independent
ground” for future similar cases to be clearly understood. 225 The United States Supreme Court
found the captured property, the brig Arrogante Barcelones, to be in the possession of the
offender, Almeida, and held it irrelevant through what roundabout or devious course the property
returned to him. 226 The Court asserted that Almeida could not claim a legal right to the brig
Arrogante Barcelones springing out of his own fraudulent actions. 227 Justice Johnson briefly
acknowledge Winder’s assertion of Almeida’s title as a bona fide purchaser, when he explained
that while a third party purchaser with a valid and authenticated condemnation without notice of
fraud may in many cases hold his purchase free from interest or restitution, Almeida’s offensive
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touch in this case “restores the taint from which the condemnation may have purified the
prize.” 228 Justice Johnson229 concluded that courts of justice will never yield the right of a party
to appear and be heard before a court to the individual who is forced to trace his title through his
own criminal acts. 230
VI.

Does the Arrrogante Barcelones Apply Today?
The Arrogante Barcelones is still good case law in that its opinion has not been

overturned, however the opinion has not been cited or directly discussed in subsequent case law
either. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Johnson briefly referenced the concept of bona fide
purchasers. 231 Despite its lack of citing history, The Arrogante Barcelones addressed an
important principle of property law that still exists today—the protected status of bona fide
purchasers. It became clear in The Arrogante Barcelones that Joseph Almeida was not in fact a
228
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bona fide purchaser. 232 As the Court correctly stated, his touch to the title of the brig that he
bought at public auction restored the taint of his criminal acts—the illegal capture. 233
The concept of bona fide purchasers, or good faith purchasers, is one that has evolved
with commercial transactions in the United States. In The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing
Principles and Property Interests, John Dolan provides that “the good faith purchase rule permits
the taker to receive interests greater than those his transferor possessed.” 234 He explains that
courts have rationalized this somewhat illogical principle based on fairness in two different
ways. 235 “Some assert that is it a question of the fault or negligence of the true owner or his
creditor.” 236 Those cases emphasize the culpability of the true property owner who does not
protect his interest in his property. 237 Those cases explain that but for the true property owner’s
negligence, the innocent purchaser would not have been misled by the appearance of the
property. 238 Other courts focused on purely economic notions, asserting that the good faith
purchaser doctrine is economically efficient and commercially convenient. 239 Both doctrines
evolved based on perceived needs the United States’ commercial expansion. 240 Specifically,
“staunch notions that a man should never be stripped of property without his consent flowed
naturally from the prairie frontier and from high seas traversed by privateers, and demanded the
development of rules upholding security of property in the face of lawless taking.” 241
By commercial standards today, in general a buyer may be considered a bona fide
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purchaser, or good faith purchaser, as long as they have no knowledge that another party has
interest or ownership rights to the goods or property in question. 242 A good faith purchaser is not
specifically defined in the UCC, however, good faith means “honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.” 243 Merchants have to observe and comply with the reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 244 A purchaser is “one who obtains an interest
in property through a voluntary transaction.” 245 Although bona fide purchasers are not
specifically defined, several articles of the Uniformed Commercial Code provide rules to protect
bona fide purchasers of certain types of personal property from prior claims to the property. 246
Thus the Court in The Arrogante Barcelones elicited one of the first judicial opinions regarding
bona fide purchasers and criminal acts that can taint ones title.
VII.

Conclusion
The case of The Arrogante Barcelones involved the cleverness of Joseph Almeida 247 and

the web of complicated set of circumstance he contrived. 248 Almeida’s tactics, are better
understood in the context of nineteenth century Baltimore, the War of 1812, and U.S. citizens’
involvement in South American privateering. 249 With this set of facts, it would have made sense
for the maritime case to hinge on the validity of the commission, condemnation, and
documentation evidence. 250 Instead, the Supreme Court ignored the arguments and propositions
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by the attorneys in this case, and grounds its decision in property law principles. 251 Thus Justice
Johnson delivered a sound, yet unexpected, articulation of bona fide purchasers 252 and their role
in property law in privateering cases of the nineteenth century. 253

VIII. Biographical Sketches
A. Joseph Almeida
Joseph Almeida was a man dedicated to the life of a privateer, no matter what country he
sailed for. Almeida was not alone in this regard, and many Baltimore merchants undertook new
roles as privateers in support of the South American Revolutions. Unfortunately, Almeida’s skill
was ultimately his undoing—not only with the United States courts, but also with the Republic of
Spain.
Joseph Almeida was described as a man with mesmerizing blue eyes, long blonde curls
draping over his broad shoulders, and generally sunworn features. 254 He emigrated from the
Portuguese Azores in 1796 and quickly built a reputation as a seaman. 255 In 1803, Almeida
became master of the Portuguese brig the Pastor. 256 While commanding the Pastor, Almeida’s
voyages included frequent stops in Baltimore where he met his first wife Ann, whom he settled
down with on Duke Street 257 and married. 258 In 1805 Almeida became a father, and a United
States citizen. 259 Unfortunately, Ann died in February 1814 while Almeida was at sea, leaving
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their four children motherless. 260 Nevertheless, Almeida carried on and soon married Teresa, in
the summer of 1814. 261 Together they shared the home on Duke Street while they added more
children to the family. 262
Upon his arrival to the United States Almeida labored to purchase his own vessel, which
he finally did in 1805. 263 During his time privateering, Almeida owned and commanded
numerous brigs including: Mary, New Mary, Joseph and Mary, Caroline, Kemp, Lousia,
Congreso/Orb, Wilson/Bolivar, Pichiucha, Presidentia, Friends Hope. 264 During the War of
1812, Almeida captured no fewer than thirty-five British ships and made almost $300,000 in net
prize proceeds. 265 In December 1814, when Almeida spotted a convoy of nine British vessels, he
singlehandedly outfought seven of the vessels, and captured five. 266
After facing excessively brutal treatment by the Spanish in Carthegena, Almeida was
eventually released, but suffered humiliation and the loss of his ship. 267 Providentially, in 1816
Thomas Taylor approached him with a business proposition to assist Buenos Aires as a
privateersman in its struggle for liberation by preying on Spanish ships. 268 To a bitter Almeida,
this seemed like the perfect opportunity for revenge. 269 In an 1817 letter from Almeida to Mr.
President of the Consulate of Cadiz, Almeida expressed his repugnance for the Spanish Empire
and announced his vendetta against it. 270 During his time as a South American privateer,
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Almeida targeted the Spanish by interrupting supply lines between Spain and its colonies,
intercepting royal communications, and viciously pillaging Spanish vessels and cargos worth
several million dollars. 271
While Almeida became infamous to the Spanish as a notorious pirate, he also became
very well known in the United States—both judicially and politically. The amount of criminal
and civil suits stirred or commenced by Almeida is remarkable, and between 1820-1825 at least
three cases involving him reached the United States Supreme Court. 272 In fact, “the
embarrassing extent to which Almeida flouted federal laws and treaties provoked President
Monroe on one occasion to dispatch a navy gunboat and a detachment of U.S. artillerists to rein
him in.” 273 He even earned a reputation with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, whom in
1819 after receiving an unexpected but colorful first-hand account of Almeida’s personal life and
career, was so fascinated by Almeida he included the encounter in his memoirs. 274

The Schooner Congreso September 12, 1817
Mr. President of the Consulate of Cadiz
My Dear Sir:
If the Government of Spain would have dealt with me as right reason and the law of persons demands, and
at the same time, if the Spanish would have recognized the independence of Buenos Aires, I would never have taken
up arms against your nation. As for me, they treated me wickedly in Carthagena, seized my brig, treated me with
both word and deed, in the end stripping me naked, could I have been treated any worse?
They have treated me like a Pirate, and who? The true pirates are the Spanish American Governors
appointed by the King… I am not a pirate, I merely defend the rights of the Homeland, and I will continue making
war until I shed my blood for its independence.
The various ships that I have taken on these coasts are guarantees of my humanity. It is not my character to
hurt the poor, but rather the prideful and zealous Spanish.
In Havana you are holding some of my men prisoner, and if I get word that you try to extort them to the
least degree, or that they are not immediately released, I will change my privateering methods, and direct these
methods at you, so that you will do your part and release these people.
Your Servant,
Jose Almeyda
271
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After increasing harassment by the U.S. law enforcement, Almeida packed up his family
and fled to St. Bart’s in May 1822. 275 For the remainder of his life he continued privateering
under commissions for various South American revolutionary governments. 276 Due to
Almeida’s constant persecution of the Spanish Empire, Spain issued a proclamation, and
possibly an award, for the “notorious pirate’s” arrest. 277 The Spanish finally captured Almeida
in 1827, thirteen years after his confinement by them in Carthagena. 278 They kept Almeida
imprisoned in the vaults of “El Morro” for over four years shackled to its sandstone walls. 279
Almeida was eventually executed on Valentine’s Day 1832. 280 He received “all spiritual
remedies required” by the Catholic Church before being executed by his Most Catholic Majesty
King Ferdinand VII of Spain’s soldier’s musket shots. 281
B. David Hoffman

David Hoffman was a prominent lawyer, teacher, and author in nineteenth century
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Baltimore, Maryland. 282 He was the founder and first professor at what would come to be,
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 283 David Hoffman was a “pioneer in
legal though and scholarship” and an “exponent of ethical conduct in the practice of law.” 284 His
scholarly works were ahead of his time, but are still renowned almost two centuries later. 285
While Hoffman built his law career in Baltimore, he grew into a worldly attorney with degrees
and publications spanning across the Atlantic. 286
David Hoffman was born in Baltimore, Maryland on December 24, 1784. 287 David
Hoffman was the eleventh of twelve children born to prominent Baltimore merchant Peter
Hoffman and his wife Dorothea. 288 Instead of going into the family’s dry goods business, David
decided to take a different path and pursue a career in law. 289 He attended St. John’s University
in Annapolis, Maryland for three years, and then returned to Baltimore to “read law.” 290 David
became a member of the Maryland Bar in the early nineteenth century. 291 “By 1816, his
lucrative practice in bustling Baltimore, the nation’s third largest city, netted him $9,000 a year,
a very healthy sum by the standards of the day.” 292
While David flourished financially in commercial practice, he preferred scholarly
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work. 293

In 1816, David accepted a position as professor of law at the University of Maryland

Law Institute. 294 Since apprenticeship was how an individual ascended to legal practice in 1814,
no law courses were being taught in Maryland when David accepted the position. 295 However,
David was committed to teaching the future lawyers of the United States, and he set aside most
of his professional time to develop curriculum for the law school. 296 “Hoffman was convinced
that his generation of practitioners had become too divorced from the philosophical debates of
the nation’s founding to appreciate the vision of law – and of lawyering – required in
America.” 297 Thus, after years of work, David published, A Course of Legal Study, in 1817. 298
“A Course of Legal Study was immediately and lavishly praised for its learnedness,” 299 and
Judge Joseph Story even pronounced it "by far the most perfect system for the study of the law
which has ever been offered to the public." 300 The publication “elicited the highest encomiums
from legal authorities throughout the country” and instantly gave David a national reputation,
later leading to the highest foreign honors. 301
Unfortunately for David, his teaching was ahead of his time, and he finally stopped in
1839. 302 In 1843 he officially resigned from University of Maryland, and was graciously
thanked by the trustees for all his contributions. 303 That same year he relocated with his family
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to Philadelphia, with the idea to revive his Law Institute there. 304 Four years later his scholarly
work took him to Europe, where “he published in the London Times a series of articles on
political, social, and economic conditions in the United States.” 305 David’s return to the United
States in 1853 was brief—he passed away in New York City on November 11, 1854 at the age of
sixty-nine. 306 David was
David married Mary McKean, a woman from a prominent Philadelphia family, in
1816. 307 Mary was the granddaughter of Governor Thomas McKean, and was regarded for he
beauty and charm. 308 They had their first son in 1817, the same year David published his work,
A Course of Legal Study. 309 Of the three children David and Mary Hoffman had, only his
daughter survived him. 310
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